Pursuant to Tax Court Rule 50(f), orders shall not be treated as precedent, except as otherwise provided.

UNITED STATES TAX COURT WASHINGTON, DC 20217

MUFUTAU SANNI,)	CMS
Petitioner,))	
V.) Docket No.	13190-13
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,)	
Respondent	<i>)</i>)	

<u>ORDER</u>

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court as set forth in the pages of the transcript of the proceedings before Judge David Gustafson at Washington, D.C., on April 18, 2014, containing his oral findings of fact and opinion, it is

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall transmit herewith to petitioner and to respondent a copy of the pages of the transcript of the trial in the above case before Judge Gustafson at Washington, D.C., containing his oral findings of fact and opinion rendered at the trial session at which the case was heard.

In accordance with the oral findings of fact and opinion, decision will be entered under Rule 155.

(Signed) David Gustafson Judge

Dated: Washington, D.C. April 29, 2014

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- 1 Bench Opinion by Judge David Gustafson
- 2 April 14, 2014
- 3 Mufutau Sanni v. Commissioner
- 4 Docket No. 13190-13
- 5 THE COURT: The Court has decided to render
- 6 the following as its oral Findings of Fact and
- 7 Opinion in this case. This Bench Opinion is made
- 8 pursuant to the authority granted by section 7459(b)
- 9 of the Internal Revenue Code, and Tax Court Rule 152;
- 10 and it shall not be relied on as precedent in any
- 11 other case.
- 12 By a notice of deficiency dated March 15,
- 13 2013 (Ex. 3-J), respondent determined deficiencies in
- 14 the Federal income tax of petitioner Mufutau Sanni
- 15 for the five years 2006 through 2010, plus additions
- 16 to tax and penalties. The parties have settled many
- 17 of the adjustments reflected in the notice of
- 18 deficiency, leaving, as the only issues for us to
- 19 decide, whether certain bank deposits are taxable
- 20 income (as respondent contends) or are instead non-
- 21 taxable loan proceeds (as petitioner contends) and
- 22 whether a portion of; income that petitioner realized
- 23 by reason of third parties' payments to petitioner's
- 24 lender is deductible as interest. For the reasons
- 25 explained below, we hold that the bank deposits are

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1	largely taxable income, and that a portion of the
2	third-party payments is deductible interest.
3	Trial of this case was conducted on April 16
4	and 17, 2014, in Washington, D.C. Petitioner was
5	represented by Thomas F. DeCaro, Jr., and respondent
6	was represented by Archana Ravindranath and Scott A.
7	Hovey.
8	FINDINGS OF FACT
9	Mr. Sanni's real estate activity
10	During the years at issue Mr. Sanni worked
11	in the real estate industry. He owned a number of
12	properties and engaged in several businesses. (Stip.
13	9-13.) He entered into various transactions with
14	Lateefat Coker. Mr. Sanni did not keep books and
15	records for any of his business activities in these
16	years. (Stip. 50.)
17	Mr. Sanni's loans and bank deposits
18	Mr. Sanni commingled funds from all of his
19	businesses into several bank accounts. (Stip. 13.)
20	To conduct his businesses, Mr. Sanni borrowed money
21	from banks and several private lenders, including
22	Douglas Goldsten and others. Some of the deposits
23	into his accounts were the non-taxable proceeds of
24	loans, and the parties have settled the character of
25	some such deposits.
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1	Of the deposits whose taxable or non-
2	taxable character was still in dispute at the time of
3	trial, there were only two non-taxable amounts:
4	first, a \$4,000 deposit made on February 27, 2007
5	(which was a loan made by NE Hunt Place, Inc.; see
6	Ex. 35-J, p. 201; Ex. 58-P, check #1010); and second,
7	a \$10,000 deposit made on October 14, 2010 (which was
8	a draw on a loan made by James Schneider; see Ex. 35-
9	J, p. 220; Ex. 41-J, p. 670). None of the deposits
10	that are derived from (or that are alleged to have
11	been derived from) Lateefat Coker were proved to be
12	loan proceeds, and we therefore find that they were
13	taxable income. Except for the amounts stipulated by
14	respondent to be non-taxable, none of the deposits
15	that are derived from (or that are alleged to have
16	been derived from) Douglas Goldsten or his entity
17	General Funding Corporation were proved to be loan
18	proceeds, and we therefore find that they were
19	taxable income.
20	Payoff of Goldsten loan
21	On October 31, 2008, Douglas Goldsten lent
22	Mr. Sanni \$510,830. (Stip. 31.) By October 27,
23	2009, the balance of that debt with interest had
24	grown to \$629,461. (Ex. 49-J.) Mr. Sanni paid off
25	that loan with the proceeds from two real estate

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1	sales. (Ex. 47-J.) Mr. Sanni arranged that, in the
2	closings of those sales, proceeds totaling the amount
3	that he owed to Mr. Goldsten would be paid directly
4	to Mr. Goldsten in order to pay off the loan. Those
5	proceeds were taxable income to Mr. Sanni, but this
6	arrangement made it seem that the payment was not
7	apparently attributable to him. Of the total paid
8	off (i.e., \$629,461), the interest component was
9	\$118,631.
10	Tax returns and audit
11	Mr. Sanni filed Federal income tax returns
12	for the years 2007 and 2009, but did not report all
13	his income on those returns, and he filed no Federal
14	income tax returns for the years 2006, 2008, and
15	2010. (Stip. 2-7).
16	The IRS commenced an examination of Mr.
17	Sanni. It identified at least some of the banks in
18	which he maintained accounts, obtained from those
19	banks monthly statements for those accounts,
20	performed an analysis of the deposits that were made
21	into those accounts for the years at issue, and
22	determined that many of the deposits were taxable
23	income that Mr. Sanni had not reported. (Stip. 55;
24	Ex. 35-J).
25	On March 15, 2013, the IRS issued its
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1	notice of deficiency for those five years; and Mr.
2	Sanni timely filed his petition on June 11, 2013.
3	Our record does not show where Mr. Sanni resided when
4	he filed his petition.
5	OPINION
6	The IRS's determination is presumed correct,
7	and the taxpayer bears the burden to prove any
8	adjustment to the income the IRS determined and to
9	prove his entitlement to any deductions he claims.
10	Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
11	(1933).
12	I. Bank deposit income
13	The taxpayer bears the responsibility to
14	maintain books and records that are sufficient to
15	establish his income. <u>See</u> sec. 6001; 26 C.F.R. sec.
16	1.446-1(a)(4). Mr. Sanni did not do so.
17	When a taxpayer fails to keep adequate
18	books and records, the Commissioner is authorized by
19	section 446 to determine the existence and amount of
20	the taxpayer's income by any method that clearly
21	reflects income. See Holland v. United States, 348
22	U.S. 121, 130-132 (1954). A bank deposit is prima
23	facie evidence of income, and a bank deposits
24	analysis is a method of income reconstruction that
25	this Court has long accepted. Tokarski v.
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- 1 Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986). When a taxpayer
- 2 keeps inadequate or incomplete books or records and
- 3 has large bank deposits, the IRS is not acting
- 4 arbitrarily or capriciously by resorting to the bank
- 5 deposits method. See <u>DiLeo v. Commissioner</u>, 96 T.C.
- 6 858, 867-868 (1991), 'aff'd, 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.
- 7 1992).
- 8 The bank deposits method of reconstruction
- 9 assumes that all of the money deposited into a
- 10 taxpayer's account is taxable income unless the
- 11 taxpayer can show that the deposits are not taxable.
- 12 The IRS need not show a likely source of the income
- 13 when using the bank deposits method, but the IRS must
- 14 take into account any nontaxable items or deductible
- 15 expenses of which the IRS has knowledge. See Price
- 16 v. United States, 335 F.2d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 1964).
- 17 At trial Mr. Sanni claimed that certain
- 18 deposits were non-taxable amounts. However, this
- 19 claim was largely undocumented. For example, he
- 20 contended that very substantial amounts were loans
- 21 from Ms. Coker, but there were no loan agreements
- 22 whatsoever between the two of them. Though both
- 23 testified, neither stated what interest rates the
- 24 supposed loans bore nor the period over which they
- 25 would be paid. A so-called "journal" in which Ms.

- 1 Coker supposedly kept track of loans to Mr. Sanni was
- 2 an indecipherable jumble, not even in chronological
- 3 order. Although Mr. Sanni evoked testimony from Ms.
- 4 Coker to ostensibly show that a March 2006 deposit of
- 5 \$249,000 was the proceeds of a loan by Ms. Coker to
- 6 Ms. Sanni, she insisted that she made the loan by
- 7 signing over to Mr. Sanni a check payable to her,
- 8 which he deposited into his account. However, the
- 9 check by which she allegedly made the loan was not
- 10 for \$249,000 but was for a different amount --
- 11 \$267,933.6**A**. (Ex. 46-P, p. 829.) Her testimony was
- 12 not at all credible.
- Supposed loan proceeds from Mr. Goldsten
- 14 (other than those the IRS stipulated as non-taxable)
- 15 depend on the uncorroborated testimony of Mr. Sanni.
- 16 Only his testimony identifies some of the deposits as
- 17 being from Mr. Goldsten; and where canceled checks do
- 18 show that others came from Mr. Goldsten, only Mr.
- 19 Sanni's testimony supports the idea that they were
- 20 loan proceeds (as opposed to taxable payments for
- 21 services, of which the evidence includes several
- 22 examples).
- Except for the \$4,000 loan from NE Hunt
- 24 Plant, Inc., and the \$10,000 draw from James
- 25 Schneider, Mr. Sanni did not credibly explain and

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1	substantiate that any of the disputed deposits were
2	loan proceeds or from any other non-taxable source.
3	We therefore hold that they were taxable income.
4	II. Interest on loan payoff
5	At trial Mr. Sanni conceded that he paid
6	off his loan from Mr. Goldsten (then totaling
7	\$629,461) by having the proceeds from two real estate
8	sales paid directly to Mr. Goldsten. Mr. Sanni
9	seemed to concede, through counsel, that this payoff
10	constituted taxable income to him as it certainly
11	does but he contended that he was entitled to a
12	deduction of the interest component (i.e., \$118,631).
13	Respondent then conceded that this amount did
14	constitute interest and was deductible from Mr.
15	Sanni's income. The computation of Mr. Sanni's
16	liability should incorporate these concessions.
17	So that the liability can be recalculated,
18	decision will be entered pursuant to Rule 155.
19	This concludes the Court's oral Findings of
20	Fact and Opinion in this case.
21	(Whereupon, at 2:27 p.m., the above-
22	entitled matter was concluded.)
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